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THE CLAIM TO SECRECY OF
NEWS SOURCE:
A JOURNALISTIC PRIVILEGE?
PETER J. GOLDSWORTh-Y*
INTRODUCTION
The recent report of the Senate of Canada on the Mass Media' declines
to recommend any modification of the common law position denying the
claim by newsmen to maintain, before official bodies, secrecy of news source.2
The case for recognition of the claim has been argued stridently by the mass
media, and recent cases have once again stimulated the controversy: in the
United States, important news media have been confronted by governmental
demands that they release, in the course of judicial proceedings, unpublished
notes, files, films and other material relating to certain political organizations;
in Canada, journalists have, in some well-publicized cases, kept silent when
questioned as to the identity of the sources of their information. 3
Generally there has been a lack of legislative and judicial response to
the newsman's claim, apart from several states of the United States where
legislative action has been taken.4 It is clear that recognition of a privilege
for newsmen must proceed from the legislature; the common law is set against
*Teaching Fellow, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1970-71.
1Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media "The Uncertain Mirror"
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970) 105-06 [hereinafter the DAUEX Committee].
2 The main concern of this paper will be with the claim to privilege in judicial
proceedings, but it is acknowledged that legislative bodies and tribunals may also be
involved. For a classic illustration of the claim before a legislative body, see the Deutsch
Case, reported N.Y. Times, May 19, 1945 at 8; 91 Congressional Record, Appdx. 2554
May 28, 1945.
3 On 18th March 1969, a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation television journalist,
John Smith, was cited for contempt of court for having refused to reveal the identity
of a confidential source of information. Smith had apparently interviewed a young man
claiming to be a member of the F.L.Q. (Front de Liberation du Quebec). See, Memoire
de la Federation Professionelle des Journalists du Quebec au Comitd Special du Senat
sur les moyens de communications de masse, le 15 avril 1970 at 3. Bills have been
presented to the Ontario Legislature by members of the New Democratic Party in
order to give newspaper reporters the right to preserve anonymity of source: see Toronto
Daily Star, Oct. 8, 1970 at 6. Recently, two reporters refused to identify their sources
before a Commission of Inquiry in Toronto (the "Duke Inquiry"). The Commissioner
decided not to take action against the reporters, because the information the reporters
could provide was obtained from other witnesses: see Toronto Daily Star, Oct. 9, 1970
at 4. See also Report, supra note 1 at 105, for reference to the Smith case.
4 See, for a recent discussion, Goldstein, Newsmen and their Confidential Sources,
The New Republic, March 21, 1970, at 13. A good bibliography on this topic is
Freedom of the Press (Southern Illinois University Press, 1968). Useful notes and
articles include P. Carter, The Journalist, his Informant and Testimonial Privilege
(1960), 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1111; Notes, (1958-59), 72 Harv.L.Rev. 768; (1956), 35
Neb.L.Rev. 562; (1950), 36 Va.L.Rev. 61.
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a privilege,5 although the common law always upheld a discretion in the judge
to aid the reluctant journalist. This was an illustration of the principle,
expressed by Wigmore, that there should be no general privilege of confiden-
tial communications. "The investigation of facts, for reaching the truth in the
administration of justice, would be intolerably obstructed by such a general
privilege."
It has been urged, with perhaps undue romanticism, that newsmen today
have a new role and deserve a special treatment to which members of other
occupational groups are not entitled. The massive growth and increased
public influence of traditional media (newspaper, magazines) in this century,
together with the gargantuan development of radio and television, has inspired
the emergence of a myth of the newsman as guardian of democratic freedoms;
he is seen as the public watchdog against official and bureaucratic abuse of
power. A measure of the change in status and public position of the newsman
is the dignity, now accorded the profession of journalists, of "the fourth
estate". It is therefore urged that the newsman in this quasi-public role should
be entitled to preserve secrecy of source before official bodies demanding
information from him. Newsmen fear professional emasculation; they fear
lest their function and efficiency as gatherers of news for the information of
the public be impeded by compulsory disclosure of sources of information.
It is customary to commence an examination of a claim to privilege by
quoting Wigmore. Wigmore named four conditions which he considered to
be essential prerequisites to the recognition of a professional privilege:
(1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed;
(2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered;
(4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.7
Wigmore opposed the creation of any privilege in favour of journalists.8
However it has been urged that newsmen do meet the four conditions. First,
there is no doubt that the relationship between newsman and informant is
5 Apart from the attorney-client relationship (see Wigmore on Evidence[McNaughton Revision] (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961) s.2282 at 541 [hereinafter
Wigmore]) which has been privileged for centuries, and is now recognized by statute
in many jurisdictions, some legislatures have extended privileged protection of other
confidential relationships. These include physician-patient, priest-penitent, patient-
psychologist, and other relationships (see Id. s.2286 at 536). Most of the moves to
establish occupational privileges outside the attorney-client privilege have been in the
United States. In Canada, Newfoundland recognizes a priest-penitent privilege by
statute (Evidence Act R.S.N. 1952, c.120 s.6.). But in England, the trend against the
granting of privilege is more pronounced: some old privileges were abolished by the
Civil Evidence Act 1968 c.64, s.16 (U.K.). On the physician-patient and priest-penitent
privileges, see Nokes, Professional Privilege (1950), 66 L.Q.R. 88 at 94.0 Wigmore, A Student's Textbook on the Law of Evidence, (Chicago: Foundation
Press, 1935) s.386 at 391.
VlI Wigmiore, s.2285 at 527. The conditions were quoted, with little discussion,
in the Report supra note 1 at 106.
8 1d. s.2286, n.9.
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confidential; secondly, the informant often relies on an express or implied
promise of confidentiality maintained by the newsman; thirdly, it is argued
that the public has a vital interest in the maintenance of a satisfactory re-
lationship between the newsman and informant, because the public is vitally
interested in the information yielded by the relationship; community opinion
must therefore favour the privilege; lastly, it is urged that the faculty of the
newsman to acquire confidential information deserves protection at the
expense of judicial and other authorities to demand disclosure.0
The fourth condition presents the crux of the dispute: it juxtaposes the
two principal interests in conflict. On the one hand, the public has an interest
in the free and unrestricted flow of information and in accurate reporting;
on the other hand, there is quite clearly an opposing public interest in the
due administration of justice. The treatments accorded the newsman's
claim to privilege in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States
will be examined to determine what weight should be accorded the various
interests at play in order to reach a fair evaluation of the claim.
The United Kingdom
In 1967, the United Kingdom Law Reform Committee reported on the
topic of privilege in civil proceedings.' 0 The Committee discussed at length
the classic privileges - against self-incrimination; in aid of litigation, settle-
ment and conciliation; and concerning husband and wife. Then, under "con-
fidential relationship", the Committee considered claims to privilege between
priest and penitent, and doctor and patient. The Committee did not mention
the claim to privilege affecting newsmen, although it did note the existence
of claims by "accountants, bankers, many servants and agents." In relation
to the latter claims the Committee reported that the duty of non-disclosure
was recognised by the courts "and given effect to by the judges so far as is
consistent with the overriding claims of the interests of justice."'1 2 In the
circumstances the Committee did not recommend the extension of a statutory
privilege to these relationship. It is obvious that the Committee was influ-
enced to its decision by the desirability of keeping the number of recognised
privileges at a minimum, and by the belief that the better solution is to grant
a wide discretion to courts to permit non-disclosure "where disclosure would
be a breach of some ethical or social value and non-disclosure would be
unlikely to result in serious injustice in the particular case in which it is
claimed."13
9 See, for example, the views of Dr. F. S. Siebert quoted in School of Journalism,
University of Missouri, Reporters' Privilege Worldwide (Freedom of Information
Center Publication No. 116, February 1964) 4. This pamphlet should be consulted as
an excellent resume of the position, particularly for its journalistic publications refer-
ences. It also gives a brief survey of the position in countries other than Great Britain,
Canada and the United States; id. at 5-6, mentioning, inter alia, cases in Norway(secrecy of source permissible if there had not been a breach of official secrecy) Puerto
Rico (privilege available). Austria gives a right of professional secrecy to the journalist.
'
0 Law Reform Committee (U.K.), Sixteenth Report (London: H. M. Stationery
Office, 1967).
1 Id. para. 54 at 23. It is curious that no news media appear in the list of organi-
zations and individuals which submitted evidence to the Committee (Annex 1, at 25).
12 Id. para. 54 at 23.
13 Id. para. I at 3.
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The position of the privilege at common law was clarified by three cases
decided in 196314 arising out of the Vassall spy scandal. A tribunal had been
set up to investigate, in very broad terms, the circumstances in which offences
under the Official Secrets Act had been committed by Vassall, an Admiralty
official. Shortly after Vassall's trial a newspaper published a statement to the
effect that Vassall's spying had led to Russian trawlers being in the vicinity
of secret N.A.T.O. sea exercises. The reporter who wrote the passage, and
acknowledged full responsibility therefore, was called by the tribunal and
asked to name the source of his information. He refused to do so and,
ultimately, was found guilty of contempt. In the other cases, the reporters
had published statements of such a nature that a source within Admiralty
was clearly indicated. Again, the reporters declined to disclose the sources
of their information and were eventually found guilty of contempt.
In all the cases, the courts first decided that the questions put to the
reporters were relevant. The courts then held that the journalists could claim
no privilege, although in particular cases a court could hold that public policy
demanded immunity for the journalist. In the Clough case, Parker C.J. added
that the former rule of practice that in interlocutory proceedings for discovery
the press would never be required to reveal the source of information had
hardened into a rule of law.'5 His Lordship reasoned thus from a consider-
ation of the wholly discretionary character of discovery, which has nothing
to do with what may have to be ordered at the trial itself. In the Mulholland
and Foster cases, Donovan L.. added that disclosure will not be ordered
unless the answer will serve a useful purpose in the instant proceedings, a
matter wholly within the discretion of the judge."6 Donovan L.J. also alluded
to the possible existence of other considerations which might lead a judge to
conclude that more harm than good would result from compelling a disclosing
or punishing a refusal to answer. His Lordship declined to give any ex-
amples, but Lord Denning M.R. suggested the case where, in a libel action,
the plaintiff wants the defendant newspaper to reveal the source of its infor-
mation before the trial.' 7 In such a case the court will not as a rule compel
disclosure because it may open others to suit.
The Foster case provides an interesting variation. The respondent
reporter in that case did not remember the source of his information. All he
refused to disclose was the type of the source. Lord Denning M.R. pointed
out that the question of type of source was relevant to the investigation of
the tribunal encompassing possible neglect of duty by those responsible for
Vassall, as knowledge of the type of source could have led to pinpointing
of the actual source.18
14 Attorney-General v. Clough, [1963] 1 Q.B. 773, [1963] 1 All E.R. 420(Q.B.D.); .Attorney-General v. Mulholland, [1963] 2 Q.B. 477, [1963] 1 All E.R.
767 (C.A.); Attorney-General v. Foster, [1963] 2 Q.B. 477, [1963] 1 All E.R.
767 (C.A.); Discussion of these cases will be found in Tapper, Freedom and Privilege(1963), 26 M.L.R. 571; Gottesman, Letter from London (1963), 18 Record of Assn.
Bar of City of N.Y. 371.
15 (1963] 1 Q.B. 773 at 790, [1963] 1 All E.R. 420 at 426.
'OAttorney-General v. Foster, [1963] 2 Q.B. 477 at 492, [1963] 1 All E.R. 767
at 772-773.
17Id. at 490, [1963] 1 All E.R. at 771.
lid. at 488, [1963] 1 All E.R. at 770.
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These three cases relied heavily on a leading Australian decision,
McGuiness v. Attorney General of Victoria.19 There a commission, estab-
lished to investigate bribery of a member of Parliament, found a journalist
guilty of contempt under a statutory provision relating to its proceedings.
On appeal, the High Court of Australia unanimously refused to recognise
any claim to privilege by the journalist. Dixon J. spoke of "the inevitable
conflict" that had to be resolved between "the necessity of discovering the
truth in the interests of justice" and "the obligation of secrecy or confidence"
to another person by the witness. 20 However, except for the few relations
where "general policy" required the existence of a privilege, such as husband
and wife, attorney and client, and, where applicable by force of statute,
physician and patient, priest and penitent, the rule was inflexible that no
mere obligation of honour could hinder the public policy inherent in re-
quiring answers in the witness box.21
Early in English law the claim to privilege based on point of honour
was dismissed. On the trial of the Duchess of Kingston,22 a physician's
claim to privilege was dismissed along with a claim by another witness based
on an obligation of honour. In dismissing the first claim the Court convinced
itself that while the revealing of secrets by a physician would ordinarily be
counted a breach of honour and indiscreet, it was otherwise when the revela-
tion was made in the course of a legal proceeding. The second claim was
treated with less seriousness; the Court was dealing with a criminal case,
and the etiquette of honour could not be observed at the same time as the
Court was trying lives and liberties. This potential restriction to criminal
cases was forgotten by later courts. 23
Another line of cases demonstrates a judicial readiness to permit silence
when the effect of the answer would be to disclose the name of a writer of
an allegedly libellous article or of the sources he has relied upon.24 It seems
that the rule is based upon consideration of the desirability of protecting
19 (1940), 63 C.LR. 73, 14 A.LJ. 38. This case appears to state the present
position in Australia in relation to the claimed privilege. See G. Sawer. A Guide to
Australian Law for Journalists, Authors, Printers and Publishers (Melbourne: Mel-
bourne University Press, 1968). See also Re Buchanan (1964), 65 S.R. (N.S.W.) 9
(Full Court of N.S.W.) 69-70.
20 (1940), 63 C.L.R. 73 at 92-105.
21 The relationships of doctor and patient and priest and penitent are the subjects
of statutory privilege in certain parts of the British Commonwealth, such as New
Zealand, Victoria, Tasmania, Newfoundland and British Honduras, and in some states
of the United States. See Report, supra note 10, para. 41 at 17.
22 (1776), 20 Howell St. Tr. R. 355.
2 3 See O'Brennan v. Tully (1935), 69 I.L.T. 115 where a newspaper editor refused
to reveal the name of a correspondent with the newspaper and was found guilty of
contempt. A report in The Times, 20th Feb. 1889, at 8, cols. 3-6 reports a case during
the proceedings of the Parnell Commission, when The Times editor refused to disclose
the names of the writers of certain articles, and was compelled to answer the specific
questions put to him.
It seems, however, that English courts are reluctant to compel newsmen to reveal
their sources, and will only do so, as the "Vassall cases" indicate, when overwhelming
considerations of public policy or justice so dictate. It is rarely, if ever, that a judge
will compel a clergyman to reveal the details of a penitential conversation, although
the privilege of the confessional is in theory denied. See Wilson v. Rastall (1792),
4 T.R. 759; 100 E.R. 1283 and R. v. Hay (1860), 2 F. & F. 4, 175 E.R. 933.
2 4 See Lyle-Samuel v. Odhams Ltd., [1920] 1 K.B. 135; and South Suburban
Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Orum, [1937] 2 K.B. 690, and cases referred therein.
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contributors from unnecessary disclosure of their names. It has been estab-
lished that, as a rule of practice, in the absence of special circumstances,
reporters need not disclose their sources in the context of litigation against
newspapers. 25
Canada
(a) At common law
Agitation in Canada has grown recently for a privilege for newsmen and
their informants in respect of their communications. The matter has been
highlighted by some recent cases,20 and bills may be introduced into the
Ontario legislature to give journalists the right to preserve anonymity of
news source.27 However, the Report of the Ontario Royal Commission into
Civil Rights recommends that no changes be made in the common law
position, on the ground "that the injury that would be done to the admini-
stration of justice" by such a privilege "far outweighs" the alleged benefits. 28
The Report notes favourably the operation of judicial discretion in this area.
In addition the Canadian Senate Committee on the Mass Media has recom-
mended that no change be made in the common law.29
It is worth noting that some difference exists between the various pro-
vincial jurisdictions as to the possibility of a claim to privilege in the context
of litigation against a newspaper. In Reid v. Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. and
Drea,30 an action for libel against a newspaper, the Court refused to grant
discovery of the identity of the newspaper's informants on the grounds of
public policy. The defences of justification, qualified privilege and fair com-
ment had been raised by the newspaper, and the informants would have to
be called at the trial to prove truth in fact and lack of malice. This view
accords with the English exception, noted above,31 to the obdurate refusal
of English courts to grant an occupational privilege to journalists in respect
of their sources in all cases. However, a different conclusion was reached in
McConachy v. Times Publishers Ltd.,82 another libel action against a news-
paper. Both the editor and the reporter were asked to name the sources of
their information for the alleged defamatory article during a discovery pro-
ceeding. The British Columbia Court of Appeal compelled both the editor
and the reporter to disclose their sources, holding that the English rule had
no application in British Columbia. Davey J.A. thought that it was unneces-
sary to consider the question of "a residual discretion to restrict cross-
examination as to a newspaper's source of information", 33 because the news-
paper article in question referred to information the reporter asserted he had
25 Georgius v. Vice Chancellor of Oxford University Press, [1949] 1 K.B. 729.
2GSee, e.g., the Smith case discussed supra note 3.
27See a report in the Toronto Daily Star, Oct. 8th, 1970, at 4.
28 See Royal Commission Into Civil Rights (Report Number One) Vol. 2
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968) 826.
20 Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, supra note 1.
80 (1961), 28 D.LR. (2d) 6 (H.C. of Ont.).
31 Supra note 15.
32 (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 349, 50 W.W.R. 389 (B.C.C.A.).
83 Id. at 352, 50 W.W.R. at 391.
[VOL. 9, NO. I
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
received from other persons. The Court refused to allow the Reid case,34
first, because it had been decided contrary to prior decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal and, secondly, because judgment had been given
before the decisions in Attorney-General v. Clough, Attorney-General v.
Mulholland and Attorney-General v. Foster.3 5 It is difficult to perceive any
strength in the second reason given, as those English cases support the Reid
case on the question of discovery in libel actions against newspapers. It is
well to note that the Reid case was referred to approvingly by the Alberta
Supreme Court in Red Deer Nursing Home Ltd. v. Taylor,30 where the
defendant in a libel action was a political candidate. The Alberta Supreme
Court considered that the defendant should receive the same special treat-
ment as newspapers in libel actions, and he was permitted to refuse to
answer a question directed to the name of a person to whom the alleged
defamatory matter was communicated. In effect, the Court sought to give a
candidate in an election campaign "as much freedom of comment as would
be given to a newspaper."37
(b) The Constitutional Aspect
The Bill of Rights, in section 1 (f), guarantees "freedom of the press".38
What effect does this provision have on the existence of a privilege in favour
of newsmen? The famous Alberta Press Bill case39 has been regarded by
some as establishing Dominion control over the media; by others, as provid-
ing flimsy authority for such control. For instance, Professor Tollefson says:
While it would be practically convenient for the federal government to have
exclusive jurisdiction over the press because of the national nature of some pub-
lications and the boundless nature of news itself, it cannot be stated with any
degree of confidence that the constitution so provides. 49
The Press Bill of Alberta, which provided inter alia that newspapers
must, upon request of a government agency, disclose sources of information,
was one of three bills by which the government of Alberta tried to establish
the machinery of Social Credit in the province. Four of the Supreme Court
justices41 found the Press Bill ultra vires as part of the general scheme of
legislation; it fell as ancillary and dependent legislation. The fifth justice
(Cannon J.) concluded that the legislation was ultra vires because it invaded
4 Reid v. Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. and Drea, supra note 30.
35 Supra note 14 for the references to the three cases.
36 (1969), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 491, (1969) 67 W.W.R. 1 (Alta.S.C.).
87Id. at 500, 67 W.W.R. at 13.
38 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44, s.l(f); see Walter S. Tarnopolsky, The
Canadian Bill of Rights (Toronto: Carswell Co., 1966) 27-32, 122-38.
89Re Alberta Legislation, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
40 E. Tollefson, Freedom of the Press, in Contemporary Problems of Public Law in
Canada 49 (O.E. Lang ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968). For back-
ground and details and a good discussion of the Alberta Press Bill, Tollefson's essay is
a good source.
4 1 Duff, CJ.C., Hudson, Kerwin, Crocket JJ.
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the sphere of the criminal law reserved to the Dominion. There is nothing
in the case which affirms exclusive Dominion control of the mass media.42
It is apparent that some matters concerning the press are subject to
provincial control.43 At the same time, some jurisdiction over the media
inheres in the Dominion. As Rand J. once pointed out, the rights of free
opinion, public debate, and discussion are necessary to Parliamentary gov-
ernment.44 Those powers which may yield a basis for some media control,
direct or indirect, by the provinces include the constitutional categories of
"Property and Civil Rights", "Matters of a merely local or private Nature",
and section 92 (14) of the British North America Act. The latter provision
is of particular significance in the present context, for it gives the provinces
exclusive authority in relation to:
The administration of justice in the province, including the Constitution, Main-
tenance and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and Criminal
Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.45
It is probable that freedom of the press, or any of the other freedoms
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, is not a class of subject which is by the
B.N.A. Act given either to the provincial legislatures or to the federal
Parliament. It can be a "matter" falling within a class of subject within
provincial jurisdiction or a class of subject within federal jurisdiction.
The right of a province to regulate the rights and privileges of witnesses
in civil proceedings would probably authorize provincial statutes granting
testimonial privilege to journalists in such proceedings. Newfoundland has
granted a privilege of secrecy of communication between priest and peni-
tent.46 This privilege is very doubtful at common law, and its validity must
depend solely on the power of the Newfoundland legislature. A statutory
privilege of secrecy given to newsmen would find a similar justification. In
criminal proceedings, the Dominion would, it is submitted, clearly have the
power to determine the rights and privileges of newsmen witnesses. To
42The statements of their Lordships which suggest Dominion control must be
read in the context in which they were delivered, viz., a concern that "the mandatory
and prohibitory provisions of the Press Bill ... interference with the free working
of the political organization of the Dominion" (Cannon J. supra note 39, [1938]
2 D.L.R. at 119, [1938] S.C.R. at 146), and the need for a parliament working under
the influence of public opinion and public discussion (Duff CJ.C. supra note 39,
[1938] 2 D.L.R. at 108-109, [1938] S.C.R. at 134-135). Obviously, these broad statements
were inspired by a fear that the character of the provincial press regulation in question
was such that the working of parliamentary institutions was gravely threatened.
43 See, e.g., the opinion of Duff C.C., supra note 39, [1938] 2 D.L.R. at 108,
[1938] S.C.R. at 134, that "there is a very wide field in which the provinces undoubtedly
are invested with legislative authority over newspapers."
44 Switzman v. Ebling, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337, [1957] S.C.R. 285.
45 British North America Act, 30 & 31 Viet. c.3, s.92 (14); s.92(13) "property and
civil rights"; s.92(16) "local matters in the province".
46 The Evidence Act, R.S.N. 1952, c.120, s.6.
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ensure uniformity in civil and criminal proceedings throughout Canada, a
concerted plan of legislation would be necessary.47
Professor Laskin points out that
[T]he test of legislative power, in relation to political liberties lies not in any
enactments which recognize them for particular purposes (as does, for example,
provincial defamation legislation) but rather in legislation which compels
obedience to them or which limits their exercise. 48
It is obvious that a provincial statute granting a privilege of secrecy of
news source to journalists in civil proceedings would involve recognition of
the freedom of the press for a particular purpose. That purpose, related as
it is to the administration of justice within the province, may be imple-
mented by provincial authorities. It is probably a very different matter for
a province to legislate to protect the right of freedom of discussion. It may
be persuasively argued that that is a matter in respect of which the Federal
Parliament alone has power to legislate.50
The United States
(a) The Statutes
The subject of claim to secrecy by newsmen has received more pub-
licity and has provoked more discussion, and action, in the United States
than elsewhere. Fifteen states now recognise a privilege of non-disclosure in
4 7As Kerwin C.J.C. said in Klein v. Bell, [1955] 2 D.L.R. 513 at 518, [19553
S.C.R. 309 at 315:
Canada, of course, could only provide with reference to all proceedings over which
it had legislative authority and the provincial legislature with reference to proceed-
ings over which it had such authority.4 8 Laskin, An Inquiry Into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev.
120.
49Duff CJ.C. in Re Alberta Statutes, supra note 39, [1938] 2 D.L.R. at 107, [1938]
S.C.R. at 133.5 0 As Professor Laskin indicates, (supra note 48 at 116) Saumur v. Quebec and
Attorney-General of Quebec, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 supports a con-
tention for provincial power of political freedoms, including freedom of the press, but
an analysis of the judgments shows that there is no clear majority in favour of an
exclusive competence. Three of the judges (Rinfret, CJ.C., Taschereau and Kerwin JJ.)
considered that the political freedoms (in this case, freedom of religion) came
within Section 92(13) of the B.N.A. Act. Four judges (Rand, Kellock, Estey and Locke
J1.) thought that the political freedoms were not within provincial competence. The
remaining two (Cartwright and Fauteux JI.) thought that both province and Dominion
could deal with political freedom in certain respects. So, only four judges deny any
provincial competence in respect of the political freedoms. But note the cases invalidat-
ing provincial legislation compelling Sunday observance - Hamilton Street Railway
case [1903] A.C. 524; Henry Birks & Sons (Montreal) Ltd. v. Montreal and Attorney-
General of Quebec, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 321, [1955] S.C.R. 799.
It is a question of classification. In the above cases, the question is whether the
provincial law is best described as one with respect to store closing hours (then com-
petence) or with respect to religious observance (then incompetence).
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favour of journalists and other newsmen in respect of their sources.51 In
1970, New York became the fifteenth state. Congress has had before it
many times bills seeking to confer a privilege of non-disclosure, but all
attempts have so far proved abortive. The statutes provide, in effect, that
no person connected with specified media in a capacity involving the collect-
ing, gathering, editing or publishing of news should be required to disclose,
in a legal proceeding or investigation, the source of any information ob-
tained by him. However, the significant differences of treatment accorded the
privilege by the various states require elaboration.
First, at least two statutes in their terms restrict the privilege to those
connected, in the capacity described in the preceding paragraph, with news-
papers.52 The other statutes extend the privilege to those associated with
other media, particularly radio and television. Note the exhaustive New York
definition: "any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, wire
service, radio or television . . .,3 The tendency is in fact towards an all-
inclusive definition. There is no good reason for restricting the privilege to
those associated with newspapers.
Secondly, at least five states54 clearly require that the communication
for which privilege is sought must have been published. Other states use
ambiguous language in this connection, for example, "procured or obtained
by him (the newsgatherer) for publication";55 "used as the basis for an
article he may have written, published or broadcast";5 6 "coming into his
51 The statutes are:
Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7 §370 (West 1958)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §2237 (West Supp. 1970)
Ark. Stat. Ann. tit. 43 §917 (West 1964)
Cal. Evidence Code §1070 (West 1966)
Ind. Sta. Ann. tit. 2 §1733 (West 1966)
Ky. Rev. Stat. §421.100 (West 1963)
La. Rev. Stat. §§45:1451 to 45:1454 (West 1965)
Md. Ann. Code Art. 35, §2 (West 1965)
Michigan Compiled Laws, §767.5a (West 1968)
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. tit. 93 ch.601.2 (West 1964)
N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A : 84A-21 : 84A - 29 (West 1969)
N.M. Stat. Ann. §20-1-12.1 (1953, Supp. 1967)
N.Y. Civil Rights Law §79(b) (effective May 12, 1970)
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., §2739.12 (West 1966)
P. Stat. Ann. tit. 28 §330 (West 1969)
It appears that, in the absence of statute, no privilege of this kind exists in any
state of the United States. In the absence of statute, the matter is left to judicial
discretion. A recent decision (infra note 74) indicates constitutional difficulties of equal
protection in the way of judicial creation of a privilege in favour of particular newsmen.
The statutes are discussed in numerous excellent articles. See, Note, The Right of a
Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Source of His Information (1950), 36 Va. L.
Rev. 61; and other articles cited, supra note 3. See also: Note, Privilege of Newspaper-
men to Withhold Sources of Information from the Court (1935), 45 Yale L J. 357;
Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources Under the First Amendment (1959), 1 Stan.
L. Rev. 541.52 Arkansas (includes radio, but not T.V.) and New Jersey, supra note 51. The
privilege granted to radio and T.V. newsmen is qualified under the Pennsylvania statute
- supra note 51, §330(b).53Supra note 51.
54 Alabama, Kentucky, California, Maryland and New Jersey, supra note 51.
Arkansas is a doubtful sixth: see, infra note 56.
t55 Arizona, supra note 51.
GOArkansas, supra note 51.
[VOL. 9, NO. 1
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
possession .. .for publication or to be published". 57 One state explicitly
provides a privilege in respect of material "whether published or not
published". 58
The Arkansas statute,59 unlike those in most other states, grants a
limited privilege only. The privilege is inapplicable where publication is in
bad faith, with malice, and not in the public interest. The New York law
contains no such qualification, although a similar provision had been incor-
porated in the'bill unsuccessfully recommended by the New York Law
Reform Commission in 1949.60 The Louisiana statute provides for a
challenge to the initial granting of a privilege to a newsman in a particular
case.61 The New Mexico statute contains a vague qualification to the privi-
lege; it is not available if disclosure be essential to prevent injustice, and any
order compelling disclosure is appealable, and subject to stay.62
The list of bodies before which the privilege may be claimed is,
generally, exhaustive. New York, for example, refers to "any court, the
legislature or other body having contempt powers", 63 and most of the existing
statutes contemplate the claim of privilege in a great variety of situations. An
exception to this breadth of definition is the Michigan statute which applies
only in respect of criminal proceedings. 64
(b) The Cases
The most important judicial pronouncement on the statutory privilege
is Re Taylor, 5 a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. A majority
of the court defined "source" in the relevant Pennsylvania statute to include
not only the identity of the informant, but also documents, inanimate objects
and all sources of information generally. On the facts of the case, a news-
paper successfully claimed a privilege of non-production, before an investi-
gating grand jury, of documents and tape recordings relating to an interview
with a person claiming knowledge of corruption in city government. Cohen J.,
in a strong dissent, restricted "source" to the name of the informant, and
not the information itself.
On the other hand, there is a distinct tendency for the courts to construe
the statutes strictly by employing generally the rule of construction that
statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. In
57New York, supra note 51.581ndiana, supra note 51.
59 Supra note 51.
60 See New York Law Revision Commission, Leg. Doe. No. 65(A), App. A (1949).
61Supra note 51.62 Supra note 51. The factors to be considered by New Mexico Courts include:
... the nature of the proceeding, the merits of the claim or defense, the adequacy of
the remedy otherwise available the relevancy of the source, and the possibility of
establishing by other means that which the source is offered as tending to prove.
63Supra note 51.
6ASupra note 51.
65 (1963), 412 Pa. 32, 7 A.L.R. (3d) 580. The cases are collected and
discussed in Annotation, Privilege of Newspaper or Magazine and Persons Connected
therewith not to disclose communications to or information acquired by such a person,
7 A.L.R. (3d) 591. This note supersedes one in 102 A.L.R. 171.
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State v. Donovan°° a New Jersey court was asked to compel newspapers to
disclose some information concerning press releases printed by them. The
names of the informants were known, but not the means by which the
newspapers had obtained the information. The Court held that the statute
granted a privilege only in respect of the sources, not in respect of the
identity of the messenger from whom the information was obtained. On
the facts of the case, the identity of the messenger was crucial to the issues,
because the publication of the releases in question was alleged to be an act
in furtherance of conspiracy to obtain an indictment, a principal defence
raised by the defendants.
Again, in Re HowardG7 a newspaperman had written a story which
included quotations from a union official, and was called in a labour dispute
case to state whether or not he had a conversation with the official on a
particular day. The lower court held that as the published article referred
to the source, the privilege could not be claimed; the privilege had been
waived. On appeal, the claim to privilege was upheld, but on the ground that
the story did not necessarily disclose the source. In Brogan v. Passaic Daily
News'8 the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in a libel action against a news-
paper, found that the privilege had been waived. The editor of the offending
article, asked upon what information it had been based, replied that it was
information obtained from a "reliable source", and the information had
been later verified. The Court considered that this statement, and the fact
that the editor had disclosed some of his sources of information, amounted
to a waiver. To testify that alleged defamatory matter came from a "reliable
source" is to waive the privilege of non-disclosure, if defences of fair com-
ment and good faith are raised.
Some courts have adopted extremely literal interpretations of the statutes
to defeat the privilege. In one case the writer who claimed the privilege
wrote for a biweekly magazine, and the California statute only protects per-
sons connected with newspapers, press associations or wire services. The
claim to privilege was defeated.69
Where statutes conferring a privilege do not exist, the interest most
frequently invoked by the courts in disallowing claims to privilege is the
public interest in the due administration of justice.70 Where the question
asked of the newsman goes to the very heart of a party's case, the court will
compel an answer. Silence will not be permitted when there is a clear and
direct conflict with the interests of justice. The Court would not usually
compel an answer when the information, or its source, are not relevant to the
principal proceeding.7'
00 (1943), 129 NJ.L 478, 30 A.2d 421.
07 (1955), 136 Cal. App. (2d) 816, 289 P.2d 537 (District Ct. of App.).
08 (1956), 22 NJ. 139, 123 A.2d 473.
09 Cepeda v. Cohane (1964), 233 Fed. Supp. 465 (D.C.N.Y.).
7 0 See, for instance, Re Goodfader's Appeal (1961), 45 Hawaii 317, 37 P.2d
472; People ex rel. Mooney v. New York County (1936), 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415,
102 A.L.R 769: People v. Durrant (1897), 116 Cal. 179, 48 P.75; Garland v. Torre(1958) 259 Fed. 2d 545, cert. den. 358 U.S. 910.
71 Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629.
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Where no statute is available, and it is apparent that the newsman will
not succeed with arguments of irrelevance or social policy, it may still be
possible in some cases, for a plea of possible self-incrimination by the jour-
nalist to succeed. In Burdick v. United States,72 a newspaper had published
articles about customs frauds. The editor who wrote the articles was asked
by a grand jury his sources of information for the articles, and he refused to
answer on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate him. His
claim was respected. As Chafee points out,73 the claim was probably
unfounded in fact. Even after the editor was given a pardon absolving him
of any crime in this connection he remained silent; he could not be forced
to accept the pardon. Learned Hand I. delivered a strong contrary opinion
in the lower Court74 to the effect that a witness only needs protection, and
he has protection when the means of safety, in this case a pardon, are at
hand.
Attempts to persuade the Courts that newsmen have a constitutionally
protected right to privilege have failed. In one of the latest cases, the
Supreme Court of Oregon stated that
[I]t would be difficult to rationalize a rule that would create special constitutional
rights for those possessing credentials as news gatherers which would not conflict
with the equal-privileges and equal-protection concepts also found in the Consti-
tution. Freedom of the press is a right which belongs to the public, it is not the
private preserve of those who possess the implements of publishing. 75
But the Court went on to say that it did not hold that the Constitution
forbids statutes conferring "reasonable privileges to withold evidence." If
the claimed privilege is to be found in the Constitution, its benefits could
not be limited to the members of a particular class. The court left open the
possibility of legislative experimentation with definitions restricting the class
of those able to claim the privilege. Generally, the courts have held that
even if the claim to privilege does involve a First Amendment liberty, the
public interest in the due administration of justice must prevail. But the
cases tacitly acknowledge that the compelled disclosure of confidential
information is, to some extent, an impairment of the freedom of the press. 70
72 (1915), 236 U.S. 79.
73Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications (Hamden, Coun.: Archon
Books, 1967) 497.
74 United States v. Burdick (1914), 211 Fed. Rep. 492.
75 State v. Buchanan (1968), 436 P. 2d 729; 250 Or. 244 (S. Ct. of Oregon);
cert. den. 392 U.S. 905. See also Murphy v. Colorado (1961), 365 U.S. 843, cert. denied
(S. Ct. of Col.). For evaluation of the constitutional aspect see J. Guest and A.
Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing their Sources (1969-
70), 64 N.W.U.L Rev. 18.
76 See, e.g., Re Goodfader's Appeal, supra note 70, a leading case on the law of
the subject where no statute exists and see Garland v. Torre, supra note 70.
For a discussion of the Buchanan case, supra note 75, see J. E. Beaver, The News-
man's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence (1969),
Oregon L Rev. 243 at 258, the author concludes that the claim to privilege based on
the First Amendment is rightly rejected for otherwise the courts would be faced with
"the task of determining who was in fact a newsgatherer entitled to the privilege".
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Evaluation
The proponents of the newsman's claim to privilege emphasize the
public interest in the unrestricted flow and wide dissemination of news infor-
matibn. In Associated Press v. United States,77 Black J. insisted that "the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public .... a free press is a con-
dition of a free society."78 It is often urged that those sources upon which the
media rely to keep themselves aware of events or of opinions of which society
should properly be informed would vanish if newsmen were compelled to
publicize sources of information in giving evidence before courts, or legis-
lative or administrative tribunals. The public is entitled to have available
to it the full facts on any matter of public interest.
The interest in freedom of information may be defined in terms of the
value accruing to society in the political, social and cultural progress of a
healthy and viable community (the social interest) or in terms of its critical
importance to the individual in providing the sine qua non of a bountiful
existence as a free member of a civilized community. This latter individual
interest is translatable into a profound social interest in the general well-
being, in a broad sense, of the individual members of society. At times, other
social interests, such as the interest in the administration of justice, conflict
with the individual interest in freedom of information. When such a conflict
occurs, the conflicting interests ought to be placed "on the same level" for
adjustment, as Roscoe Pound insisted.7 9 Otherwise, the personal prefer-
ences of the decisionmaker may be influenced by the verbal symbols "social"
and "individual". Thus, as Professor Julius Stone has pointed out, 80 the
right of free speech has normally been conceived as a conflict between society
and the individual. "Yet on a true analysis society as a whole is also deeply
concerned in the preservation of the claim of individuals to freedom of
speech." 8' The conflict between the claims involved in freedom of informa-
tion, in its specific expression as the unimpeded flow and wide dissemina-
tion of news information, should be stated as one between the social interest
in the due administration of justice and the integrity of existing institutions,
and the social interest in political, social and cultural progress.
There is, undoubtedly, in freedom of information a fundamental safe-
guard of the democratic process and of the effective functioning of the demo-
cratic state.82 This effective functioning is only possible if organs of opinion
yield the most accurate information essential to each individual to ascertain
his position vis-a-vis the society and his fellow citizens. At the world level,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the right to information
77 (1944), 326 U.S. 1.
78 Id. at 20.
79 Pound, Survey of Social Interests (1943), 57 Harv. L Rev. 2.
80 Julius Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (Stanford: Stanford Univ.
Press, 1966) 182.
81Id.
82 As Stone points out, id. at 348, there is a "special value for political progress
attaching to wide public discussion stimulated by the press."
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inhering in the individual.83 In the context of freedom in Canada, Monsieur
L~pine comments:
La liberte de 1information est un concept tres vaste: il comprend le droit din-
former et d'&tre inform6; il signifie done pour l'individu le droit de dire et
d'exprimer les faits, les 6v6nements et ses ides; le droit d'avoir acc aux ides
et aux opinions des autres; il signifie le droit pour l'individu de discuter; de criti-
guer les faites, les 6v6nements et la conduite des autres homines.8 4
The claim to freedom of information is rarely explicitly recognized, but
oblique reference is apparent in such fundamental freedoms as speech, press
association and religion. In Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court of the
United States recently affirmed that "this right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth .... is fundamental to our free
society".8 5 In the context of the Leviathan state, with its immense powers
remote from the influence or control of the individual, the right to freedom
of information is crucial. The interests that seek to disrupt or displace free-
dom of information should be overwhelming before granting recognition.
But is the free flow of information in fact restricted by the absence of a
privilege of secrecy in favour of newsmen and their informants? It has not
been reliably demonstrated that the absence of such a privilege hinders
freedom of information; or, more to the point, that the creation of such a
privilege increases the information gained by reporters. It has been sug-
gested that "the interference with the flow of information .... is impercept-
ible or non-existent. 8 6 Reference has been made to the superiority of infor-
mation found in the New York Times,87 although until 1970 the State of
New York did not have a privilege statute.8 Again, it is said that better
news reporting is not guaranteed by a statute for two reasons. First, the
newsman will not refrain from publishing confidential information out of fear
that he might later be cited for contempt for failing to reveal his informant.
Second, even though no statute exists, the newsman will not reveal his inform-
83 G. A. Res. 217 A., U.N. Doe A/810 (1948) art. 19. This document is probably
not a legal instrument possessing international normative validity - see J. Brierly, The
Law of Nations (6th ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1963) 294. It should be noted that,
historically, freedom of information has been recognized as having limits. See, generally
C. Antieau, Rights of our Fathers (Vienna, Va.: Coiner Publications, 1968). See also
B. de Spinoza, Tractatus - Theologico - Politicus (1670) The Chief Works, Vol. 1,
Ch. XX (R.H.M. Elwes translation). A modern echo of this limitation is found in the
Arkansas privilege statute, supra note 51. Other limitations proceed from the nature of
the information, e.g., demafatory matter, or as in the Wisconsin Statute which prohibits
the publication of the names of child victims of sex crimes (see State v. Evjue (1948),
253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W. (2d) 305), and from the social or political situation, e.g.,
wartime. See Re Drummond Wren [1945] O.R. 778, 4 D.L.R. 674 (Ont. H.C.) onjudicial application of Charter provisions on human rights as indicative of public policy.
84 Lpine, La Libert6 de l'information dans le droit Canadien (1968), 14 McGill
L. J. 733. Freedom of information has, says Lpine, been developed by dicta in the
Supreme Court of Canada. LUpine thinks this freedom is best protected by the courts,
rather than by the Parliament or the provincial legislatures. The writer does not com-
ment directly on our problem.
85 (1969), 394 U.S. 564.86Note, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's Source: A Compromise Proposal
(1959), 54 N.W.U.L. Rev. 243.
87R. Semeta, Journalist's Testimonial Privilege (1960), 9 Clev. Mar. L. Rev. 311,
but see criticism of this kind of evidence as "meaningless" in Guest and Stanzler, supra
note 75 at 43.
88 Supra note 51.
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ant when judicially ordered to do so.s0 However, further research into this
question beyond the scope of this paper is obviously necessary.
A countervailing interest may, at times, be found in the public need to
ensure the integrity and authority of legislative, judicial, and administrative
bodies. The number of privileges recognized at common law was severely
limited. It was no doubt considered that only overriding social policy could
justify silence by a witness in legal proceedings, for otherwise the integrity
of the court of law as an impartial and accurate arbiter would be eroded. As
has been noted, this interest in the administration of justice is that most fre-
quently enlisted by courts to justify refusal to permit silence by newsmen.
It may be noted that this same interest plays some part in the refusal of the
English and Canadian courts to compel newspapermen to answer questions
directed to source in discovery proceedings in the course of litigation against
newspapers: the courts will not permit their procedures to be used by
plaintiffs as a device for finding other defendants. 90
Another interest that might be weighed against this interest in the
freedom of information is the maintenance of law and order. This is related
to, but distinct from, the interest in the integrity of institutions. As distinct
from the later interest, it is more specifically concerned with disclosure by
newsmen in criminal proceedings; or, in civil proceedings, information re-
lating to criminal activities. At times, this interest has been suppressed in
the face of overriding public policy, as in the refusal of the law to compel a
spouse to testify against the other spouse. The privilege against self-
incrimination was originally inspired by public policy considerations but has
been weakened by statute; generally, an answer must be given to a question,
although it cannot later be used against the witness.91 In this case the public
policy inherent in the privilege against self-crimination is not of such a
magnitude as to require the total suppression of information contrary to the
interest in law and order.
A number of individual interests range themselves against these public
interests in the administration of justice, and law and order. First, the in-
formant often has an interest in keeping his identity hidden, whether for
reasons of personal safety, or economic security, or social position. But it
cannot be said that in every case such an interest exists. Should a newsman
be allowed to be the arbiter of the existence of the interest? It has been
said that the privilege, where it exists, belongs to the newsman. 92 The cases
on waiver of the privilege suggest this. It has been said that "[T]he inform-
ant's protection .... is purely derivative; he has not recourse of any kind
89 See Note, 36 Va. L Rev., supra note 4 at 82, but see Guest and Stanzler, supra
note 75 at 56.0oSee cases cited supra notes 14, 27.
01 See, e.g., Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.307, as am. by S.C. 1952-53
c.2, ss.4(1) and 5.02 Several states of the United States which have privilege statutes clearly grant
the privilege to the newsman, e.g., New Jersey, supra note 51. It has been held that
the Indiana statute grants the privilege to the reporter and can only be claimed by him.
See Lipps v. State (1970), 258 N.E. 2d 622. Note also the Report of the Canadian
Senate Committee, supra note 1 at 105-06. But see Pais v. Pais, [1970] 3 All E.R. 491(Baker J., P.D. & A.).
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if the reporter elects to reveal his identity. '93 This "rule" is anomalous. As
Professor Cross says, "it is of the essence of a privilege that it may be waived
by the person who enjoys it."'94 If the privilege belongs to the newsman, the
informant has no protection beyond an obligation of honour. The American
statutes95 already discussed adopt ambiguous language, providing that no
person "shall be compelled" or "shall be required" to disclose. If the social
interest to be protected is freedom of information, in the dissemination of
news, surely the only person able to waive the privilege should be the inform-
ant. If it is purely a matter in the discretion of the journalist, then it is
arguable that the confidence of informants would not be encouraged any
more than it is now when no privilege exists. On the other hand, it is
arguable that the confidence of informants will be guaranteed because they
know that their confidants need not disobey the law to preserve the confi-
dence, and hence the danger of disclosure is certainly minimized. But it is
apparent that the maximum protection of informants will only be achieved
if the privilege belongs to the informant. Further, as has been noted, there
is sometimes a danger of implied waiver of privilege in the testimony given
by the newsman which can best be avoided by granting the privilege to the
informant.9 6
It has been suggested that the newsman is entitled to claim a profes-
sional or economic interest in gathering news information that deserves pro-
tection. In most cases where the argument has been made, it has been
roundly dismissed.97 The courts emphasize that this interest cannot prevail
against the public interest in the due administration of justice. The claim
has usually been framed in terms of forfeiture of estate and, as such, is clearly
untenable because the newsman's answer would not result in forfeiture by
law.98 However, the argument has been successful in encouraging a judicial
leniency in some cases.99
Any rule which seeks to strike a balance between the interests at play
should be carefully considered. Precision in the definition of terms should
be sought: key terms such as "source" should be carefully defined and the
class of those benefiting should be defined in the most exact terms possible.
In this way, the effect of judicial discretion on the question of the legitimacy
of the claimed privilege is minimized. But a judicial discretion should be
retained to deal with certain exceptional cases which it is submitted, may
not be entitled to the privilege, although prima facie within the terms of the
statute. For example, the Arkansas limit in the privilege is desirable: the
privilege should not, for reasons of public policy, be claimable where publi-
cation consequential on the obtaining of secret information is in bad faith,
93 R. Weinberg, Confidential and other Privileged Communications (Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1967) 40.94 Supra note 6 at 225.
95 Supra note 51.
96 On implied waiver, see Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, supra note 68.
97See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton (1911), 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781; and see Note,
36 Va. L. Rev. supra note 4 at 68-69. Similarly, claims to privilege based on a code
of professional ethics have been dismissed. See e.g., Re Wayne (1914), 4 Hawaii
Dist. F. 475.98 Plunkett v. Hamilton (1911), 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781.
99 See unreported case discussed Note, 36 Va. L Rev. supra note 4 at 69.
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malicious and not in the public interest. 100 Another desirable limitation on
the privilege derives from the public interest in the general security: a news-
man should not be allowed to remain silent when the source of the informa-
tion he is seeking to hide, bears on a subject of national security. A limitation
as to information relating to the details of any proceeding required to be
secret under state or federal law is in the public interest. However, it is sub-
mitted that any further limitation compelling an answer simply because the
newsman is the only source available and the trial cannot be concluded
without his testimony, is unreasonable. The effect of such a limitation would
be to vest too large a discretion in the judge sufficient to enable the con-
servative judiciary to nullify the privilege in most cases.
As suggested above, the privilege should belong to the informant, not
to the newsman. Just as, in the attorney-client relationship, it is the client
who enjoys the privilege,' 0' in the present situation the informant enjoys the
privilege in the same sense. The newsman should not have a power of waiver.
If the chief interest to be protected is, as is urged, the public interest in the
unrestricted flow and wide dissemination of information, the strongest protec-
tion will be provided only if the right of waiver belongs to the informant.
If the newsman may waive, the argument for statutory protection is weakened,
if not destroyed. For where, prior to the statute, the informant relied on an
expresss or implied promise by the newsman not to reveal, he would now,
after the statute, rely on an express or implied promise by the newsman not
to waive the privilege. In other words, the principal justification for a privi-
lege statute - to encourage informants by giving a guarantee of privilege
upon which the state will renege only in exceptional circumstances and which
cannot be waived by anyone other than the informant - would be destroyed.
Finally, the term "privilege" is inaccurate unless the informant has the right
of waiver, for the historical connotation of a legal privilege includes a power
in the person who has made the confidential communication to prevent
disclosure.102
It is important that the terms of a privilege statute be as precise as
possible. First, the category of newsman entitled to refuse to answer must
be unambiguous. It is submitted that all newsmen should be included; there
is no valid reason for the exclusion of, say, reporters for underground or
student newspapers. The New York statute 03 contains broad definitions of
"professional journalist" and "newscaster". In the modem age there is,
again, no valid reason for excluding the latter from the benefit of a privilege
statute which extends beyond the written press to radio and television.
'OoSupra note 51.
101The basis for the attorney-client privilege is the benefit of the public; it is the
privilege of the client and of the public; per RiddeU I. in U.S.A.v. Mammoth Oil Co.,[1925] 2 D.L.R. 966, 56 O.L.R. 635. See also Canary v. Vested Estates Ltd., [1930]
3 D.L.R. 989, [1930] 1 W.W.R. 996, 43 B.C.R. 1. So too, the physician-patient privilege
is said to rest on the need to promote public health - see Wigmore, supra note 5,§2380(a). See Pais v. Pais, supra note 92.
102The "informer" privilege is exceptional. There, the recipient, rather than the
communicant, possesses the privilege. This is of course due to the special position of the
State as recipient. The privilege is not absolute; it is unavailable where disclosure is
necessary to show the innocence of an accused - see R. v. Blain (1960), 33 C.R. 217,
31 W.W.R. 693, 127 C.C.C. 267 (Sask. C.A.).
o3 Supra note 51.
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As the circumstances of Re Taylor 0 4 suggest, the term "source" should
be defined with greater accuracy. That case extended the statutory protec-
tion to material compiled by the newspaper and which was, in a broad sense,
a source. A possible distinction might be desirable between news obtained
from a source, in the sense of an informant, and news obtained without the
aid of any informant but by reporter "scouting" and "probing." If the interest
mainly protected is the public interest in the continued flow of information,
then, logically, only cases in which information has been obtained from an
informant on a promise of confidentiality, express or implied, ought to come
within the protection of a statute granting a privilege. For example, suppose
a newsman writes a story on the activities of some criminal group, from
bootleggers to drugtakers to gangsters, after having infiltrated the group in
disguise. Assuming he has not committed a crime in the course of gathering
the information, should the newsman be compelled to answer questions
directed to a disclosure of the sources of his information? One can say
that the public interest in freedom of information is at stake in this situation,
but if so, a change of emphasis is then necessary, for there is no informant
who is relying on an express or implied promise of non-disclosure. It then
must be argued that newsmen will be less zealous about embarking on such
fact-finding activities if disclosure is forced because, for instance, they fear
reprisals from resentful members of the group they have been investigating
or that it will, in the future, be more difficult to infiltrate such groups. But
it is clear that the traditional argument that newsmen must protect their
"leaks", or they will "dry up", is weak in this type of case.
It is therefore suggested that only the source, as informant, ought to
receive protection. As the dissenting opinion in Re Taylor said, "it is the
name of the informant and not the information itself which is protected.' 0 5
In Re Taylor itself the informant was already known, yet the Court pro-
tected the material associated with that informant. What possible reason
can be adduced for continuing protection when the name of the informant
is known? In such a case the public interest in the administration of justice,
in the correct disposal of litigation, is not confronted with the public interest
in the free flow of information. The criterion for ascertaining the relevance
of the latter interest must be the possibility of the intimidation of future
informants. Such a possibility is non-existent in a case like Re Taylor. The
criterion upon which all information and material ought to be tested for
qualification to privilege is whether the tendency of the information and
material is to disclose the informant. Once the informant is known all claims
to privilege or information and material connected with the information
ought to fall. Thus, the Maryland Court of Appeals has intimated that it
would not uphold a newsman's claim to privilege in respect of the details of
the information when he had revealed the name of the source.110  The
Maryland statute in question protects only "the source of any news or
information" and not the "news or information.'
0 7
3o04 Supra note 65.
1o5 Supra note 65 at 589, per Cohen J.
106 State v. Sheridan (1967), 248 Md 320, 236 A.2d 18.
1o Supra note 51.
1971]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
A final suggestion relates to the model law prepared by the Harvard
Students Legislation Research Bureau.108 The model extends protection to
a wide variety of newsmen, and establishes procedures for challenge to the
protection by any "body, officer, person or party." With a similar intent, the
Louisiana statute 09 provides that the persons seeking the information may
apply for an order revoking the privilege. The application must state "the
reason why the disclosure is essential to the protection of the public interest."
Revocation of the privilege may only be granted when "disclosure is essential
to the public interest." These types of procedural safeguards are desirable.
Conclusion
The principal trends in the major common law countries in relation to
the newsman's claim to secrecy of news source have been defined. In the
result, it appears that a persuasive case can be made for the legal recog-
nition of the claim, subject to limitations in the best interests of public policy.
While it is not yet certain, because of a lack of empirical data, that freedom
of information is protected and advanced by giving a privilege to newsmen
or their informants, some part at least of the newsman's fear of emasculation
occasioned by the absence of the privilege may be justified. It is considered
that the matter should no longer be left entirely to judicial discretion as it
is in the United Kingdom and Canada. Further, it is not sufficient to dismiss
the claim by saying, as did the Canadian Senate Committee on Mass
Media,"10 that the traditional privileged relations, such as attorney and client,
are not "analagous to that between newsman and informant.""' To do so is
to rely on narrow categories and definitions, and to fail to take account of
changing social, political and cultural conditions. If it is objected that, unlike
the usual privileged relationship, the privilege in this case may be claimed by
the newsman, a statute could provide in unequivocal terms that the privilege
belongs to the informant and may be waived by him alone. If some Ameri-
can statutes have seen fit to repose the privilege in the newsman alone, it
does not follow that Canada should slavishly adopt this philosophy. If it is
objected that, unlike the traditional privileged relationship, this claim is made
in respect of any information, whether a confidential communication or not,
a simple statutory provision could restrict the privilege to traditional con-
cepts. Finally, it is not sufficient to dismiss the claim by pleading, as did the
Canadian Senate Committee, that there is a problem of definition; who is,
and who is not, entitled to the privilege. Again, the necessity for precise
definition of terms, discussed above, is apparent and would solve this alleged
problem. The Report of the Canadian Senate Committee is, on the point of
privilege, unconvincing in its reasons for refusing to recommend a change
in the law. The shocking flippancy of the Committee in saying that if gaol
terms imposed on newsmen were short, most newsmen would find the
108 D'Alemberte, Journalists Under The Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources
of Information (1968-69), 6 Harv. Journal on Legis. 307. See 327-330 for a tabular
breakdown and analysis of the U.S. statutes. At 341, "An Act to Protect Confidential
Sources of Information" appears. S. 3 of the draft statute specifies "Procedure For
Divestiture of Privilege."
10 0 Supra note 51, § 1453. See also the New Mexico statute, supra note 51, which
makes any order for disclosure appealable, and subiect to stay of proceedings.
110 Supra note 1.
M Id. at 107.
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experience "refreshing, educational and possibly even profitable"1112 must cast
doubt on the seriousness with which the newsman's claim has been considered.
A statute should ideally set forth the privilege as precisely as possible.
The United States' experience has taught that interpretation will be aided by
thoughtful and careful definition of terms. A statute should be liberal in its
application, granting the privilege to all members of news media who gather
or edit the news; the privilege should be claimable before any bodies having
contempt powers.
Some restriction of the privilege is nevertheless desirable. Even where
there is a prima facie entitlement to the privilege the availability of the pri-
vilege should be conditioned by reference to "the public interest."" 8 It is
considered that this concept of the public interest should be restricted to
clearly defined cases to avoid the possibility of judicial emasculation of the
privilege in cases where no serious public interest is involved. The interests
of the national security would, of course, be one criterion upon which to
determine the availability of the privilege. The privilege should likewise be
inapplicable where the publication of the information sought to be privileged
is in bad faith, with malice and not in the public interest. However, it should
be made clear that the concept of public interest does not extend to cases
where the newsman is the only available source of the information and
without his testimony the proceedings, whether before legislative, judicial, or
administrative bodies, cannot be successfully concluded without his testimony.
To impose such a limitation would be tantamount to returning the claim to
secrecy to the untrammelled discretion of the judge.
Two trends in the United States should be avoided in Canada by careful
drafting in any new statute. First, the privilege of secrecy ought to be
restricted to the name of the informant and any material tending to disclose
the identity of that informant. The news or information should not in itself
be privileged. Secondly, the privilege should, by clear definition, be granted
to the informant, not to the newsman. The legal conception of an occupational
privilege would seem to require that the informant alone be entitled to the
right of waiver; and, logically, the public interest in freedom of information
is best served, if it is served at all, by the granting of the privilege to the
informant who will alone have the power to reveal or not to reveal, subject
of course to the tentative limitations on the availability of the privilege out-
lined in the preceding paragraph.
112 Id. at 107.
113 See supra note 108. See s. 2 of the draft statute there referred to.
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